Diatribe the First: Why the Surge Won't Work and Its Consequences for the Occupation

As you may know, the present military strategy in Iraq is to increase the troop levels for several months, stabilize the country, and then exit. The surge is ramping up and will be in full force by the beginning of July and will last until late September.

However wonderful the scenario sounds, it is complete fiction. The plan will not work. At best it will result in failure, at worst it will result in escalation, more troops in Iraq (which means more American deaths), and the only plausible course for success to be a military draft.

To understand why the plan will fail, we must first, as with everything, consider the history. Let's go back to the beginning of the problem: when the administration and the world realized that the invasion of Iraq was a complete disaster. It was actually a double disaster in that there were no WMDs, making the war meaningless and insane, and also we were not exactly greeted as liberators. The lack of WMDs made the war tragic, the insurgency made the war a quagmire. Despite their stupidity, the Bush administration finally, although belatedly, accepted that the insurgency was real, that they were unprepared to deal with it and the emergence of a sectional conflict, and that any occupation would be tough to enforce (and costly) and complicated to end. With this realization came a new plan from the Pentagon. Donald Rummsfeld, after discarding the whimsical notion of a quick occupation followed by a flowing democracy while Iraqi oil reserves paid the bill, developed the plan, with Gen. Casey, of "decreasing the footprint." The "footprint" refers to the area that U.S. forces would be supervising and placed in harms way. The idea of "footprint" is both geographical and institutional. Rummsfeld wanted to gradually move American forces out of safe spots and into the most needed trouble zones until, finally, the Iraqi security forces were able to handle the entire country. He also wanted to pass on authority from American military personnel to Iraqi civilians.

Unfortunately for everyone, the "decreased footprint" plan was as unsuccessful as it was ill-conceived. After about 3 years of implementation (from 2003 to Nov. 2006), the United States was no closer to exiting, the country was as dangerous as ever (if not more dangerous), and Iraqi forces were in no position to take over security responsibilities of any type. In reality, there was no secret as to why the plan had failed. 150,000 troops was wildly insufficient to quell a growing insurgency and train the Iraqis. If there weren't enough troops to stabilize the country and stop people from looting when it was relatively stable (immediately following the invasion), then how could there be enough to handle a growing civil war increasingly mobilizing more distraught people and being funded from international terrorist organizations (like Al Quada) and national governments (Syria and Iran)? I say it was no secret, because this is exactly what the military's top brass was telling everyone (everyone except Congress, that is). So why was it pursued for so long? Two reasons: One, Rummsfeld wanted to get out of Iraq as quickly and cheaply as realistically possible. The insurgency was an embarrassment to him and it was costing the pentagon a lot of money. All the while, he didn't want to admit that the invasion was a mistake, that the American army was unprepared to deal with an occupation, and that his generals had been correct in advising that a true occupation force would need about 500,000 troops (Vietnam?) Two, Bush (or to be more precise, Karl Rove), thought that by promising and maintaining a lighter "footprint" the war as a political issue would be avoided. Bush thought he could win on domestic issues combined with grand-standing about vague notions like "terrorism" while Iraq was left as a sideshow with little importance. He thought he'd be able to do this, because no one on the opposition had any realistic defined proposal beyond total, immediate withdrawal, which was politically unpalatable. And so he did in 2004.

We all know why the "decreased footprint" idea was abandoned. The day following the 2006 November midterm elections, Bush announced Rummsfeld's resignation and with him his strategy in Iraq. The election had been a disaster for Republicans and was largely seen as a reaction to Bush's strategy in Iraq. Those on the left just wanted out and those on the right just wanted to win. I remember Bush's press conference well: I was struck by the president's humility and encouraged that the election had forced Bush to fire Rummsfeld. However, I was a little apprehensive. I had always considered Rummsfeld as a scapegoat for everything with the Iraqi war, from Abu Gahrib to the actual invasion when the real blame should have been placed with Cheney and Bush. I figured that by removing Rummsfeld, Bush was losing a lightning rod more than anything. I just hoped that the decision wouldn't allow Bush to wash his hands of all the problems in Iraq.

As it turned out, my first surprise was justified: Bush was a little TOO humble during that news conference. He was putting on an act of being beaten; of being pushed by the electorate towards a new course. In reality, the election allowed Bush to distance himself from an old faulty policy and embark on a new one, which was something he was probably aching to do for almost a year. Ironically, the departure of Rummsfeld, an easy target for Democrats, represented a further commitment to Iraq and the end of a policy that included disengagement.

The new policy, as we heard in early January, would be a troop surge. There are two ways to look at the surge: believe that the president's plan is genuine or cynically believe that it is a planned babystep towards escalation. I'll leave it up to you decide which you believe. (more on that later)

In any case, the announcement of the surge was immediately met with consternation. Those on the left asked how more troops would help us find a way out while those on the right questioned if 30-40,000 more troops could really make a difference (and if so, why not 20 or 50 thousand?). The reason for its confusion is that it was badly explained by both the news media and the administration. The news media didn't explain it because they're incompetent and it doesn't lend itself to soundbytes beyond "Bush announces surge plan," etc. The administration made no effort to genuinely inform the public because they knew the plan would have little impact and was easily prone to obvious failure. The failure of the administration to adequately explain the proposal should set off red flags. Because they know it will probably fail, they will probably argue that the reason for the failure was not enough troops. The "exit strategy" will mean more troops, longer tours, and possibly even a military draft (if a conservative is elected in 2008 with a mandate for such a drastic measure).

At this point you might be asking, 'what is the plan?' Most summations of the strategy have been that the army will send in a bunch of troops to smash the insurgency, damper growing sectional conflict, and quickly come home, presumably by the end of the year. This is not the plan. The plan was born from past experiences and a change of military leadership. Although large areas of Iraq, especially those with mixed sunni/shia populations (like Baghdad), are in a state of proto-Civil War, some mixed areas have been stabilized. The success areas are those in which American security forces have been able to install martial law and remove/keep out the sectarian gangs. Also, because of a large presence in these areas, the American military has worked with the civilian population and gained their trust. The prototypical example is the now somewhat spectacular stability of Tal Afar. It is from Tal Afar that new commanding general in Iraq, Gen. Petraeus, has gathered his advisors. With the ousting of Rummsfeld came the ousting of Gen. Casey. In his place, Gen Patraeus, who holds a PhD. from Princeton, organized and pushed for the new surge strategy. It was his immediate subordinates who sold the surge plan to Bush in Nov. and Dec of 2006. The plan they proposed was to turn Baghdad into Tal Afar by concetrating a large American force (about 25 to 30,000 troops) in heavily disputed neighborhoods in the capital city. They hoped, or declared, that stability in the most highly charged areas of the city would spread out to the rest of the city. In turn, Baghdad would serve as a launching pad for the new Iraqi government to establish their authority and eventually quell the provinces if nothing else than by leading by example. To stabilize central Baghdad, the American military would need those extra 30,000 troops, which could only be found by manipulating the rotation system for active duty for a couple of months and selling the idea of a "surge" to congress.

To review, the surge is so small because it will apply to only a few neighborhoods in Baghdad. Its success can be judged in September. But analysts are quick to point out that the plan has serious problems. One, stabilizing a small area in Baghdad will not neccessarily halt sectarian violence in the rest of the city. Groups will probably move away from the "hot" zones in Baghdad to previously more stable areas and continue their violence there. Two, the idea that peace in one city will somehow spread to outlying areas is little more than a leap of faith. Such a scenario has proven itself several times in military history to never occur (most relevantly here, in Vietnam and Alfghanistan). Isurgents merely move to the countryside and continue their attacks there. Most planning of attacks, including gathering weapons and building bombs, already occurs in the hinterland of Baghdad. How would the surge put a stop to this. Three, once the surge ends, in the beginning of October, there is little guarantee that violence will not recommence. In fact, many groups may just hide out the few months that the Americans have a larger presence, especially in those areas of Baghdad. Additionally, it isn't clear how Iraqi forces are supposed to trained in these magical three months when there hasn't been success in that area for 4 years.

Now to the question of what the surge means for the larger occupation. In reality, it is difficult to analyze the long-term effects of the surge without some idea of Bush's thinking process (the genuine vs. cynic choice I mentioned earlier). Going with the assumption that the surge will fail in its larger goals, if not its small goals of pacifying a few neighborhoods in Iraq, there are two courses of action. One, assuming that Bush is embarking on this plan in a genuine effort to win the war, then Bush himself will be faced with two options: cut his losses and leave because to win the war would not really be worth it or fully commit the United States to the occupation of Iraq, which would require a military draft and an occupation force of about 500,000 (the same size of force that failed in Vietnam, by the way.) Two, assuming that Bush is using the surge to introduce the American people to the idea of sending more troops, Bush will continue to call on more troops, not unlike Johnson during Vietnam, and pass the problem on to the next president who will then be faced with either withdrawing or full-engagement. As you can see, the options are limited and it doesn't matter too much what Bush's rationale is. The results will probably be comparable.

I hope that all voters in the 2008 election consider the scenarios available. I know full well that packing up and leaving from Iraq would be a disaster. Undoubtedly, it would lead to a bloody civil war and possibly genocide. The nation would serve as a breeding ground and safe-haven for terrorist organizations. It would destabilize the entire region and put oil reserves in danger. It would also display American weakness.

With all of the above in mind, I believe it's time to come to terms with our...umm...redeployment away from Iraq. My first reaction was that we, as a nation, had a responsibility to "stay the course" and establish democracy in a nation we had invaded for that purpose. However, I could neither die or kill for such a purpose. As a man of my age it would be intellectually dishonest of me to push for continued occupation if I were unwilling to do the occupying. Aside from my personal ethics, there is the larger lesson of Vietnam. The United States could never realistically win in Vietnam, even with a fully mobilized military. We cannot win in Iraq without a fully mobilized military. Perhaps we can win with one, but is it worth taking the chance? In 1969, Richard Nixon took office and had the opportunity to end the war with the same terms he would sign 4 years later. In between, 25,000 Americans (half of the deaths in Vietnam) were killed in the Southeast Asian quagmire. Was it worth it? Will it be worth it to sacrifice more American lives for the same result just because we can't come to terms with the psychological effects of losing? One of the problems with getting out of Vietnam is that many families could not handle that their husbands/sons/fathers had died for no purpose. Luckily, we are at a stage when the military deaths are such a small percentage of our population that the impact of the war has not really affected most families (even those with members serving). We should take advantage of that situation and withdraw as quickly as possible before more families are destroyed. It is time to leave Iraq.